The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options
We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs...
New light on choice of investment strategy
According to classical economics, there are no gains to be made in an efficient market. Yet markets are often far from efficient and the gains are...
Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-Ins
The aim of the bail-in proposal is that governments should have an alternative option to taxpayer-funded rescues of systemic banks. It operates...
The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts
We use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by risk averse...
Bond Variance Risk Premia
Using data from 1983 to 2010, we propose a new fear measure for Treasury markets, akin to the VIX for equities, labeled TIV. We show that TIV explains...
Smart Buyers
In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of...
Borrow Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts
Private equity sponsors pay special attention to designing capital structure, making buyouts an interesting setting for examining capital structure...
On the drivers of commodity co-movement: Evidence from biofuels
We use the recent introduction of biofuels to study the effect of industry factors on the relationships between wholesale commodity prices...
Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers
We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to...
Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative RiskAversion
It is established that the standard principal-agent model cannot explain the structure of commonly used CEO compensation contracts if CRRA preferences...
What is the Consumption-CAPM missing? An Information-Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Asset Pricing Models
We study a broad class of asset pricing models in which the stochastic discount factor (SDF) can be factorized into an observable component and a...
Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs
We develop an optimal dynamic contracting theory of overpay for jobs in which moral hazard is a key concern, such as investment banking. Overpaying...
The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders Compete for Flows
An important recent theoretical literature argues that the threat of exit can represent an effective form of governance when the blockholder is a...
Making Europe Safer
Open letter by the international Euro-nomics academic group (www.euro-nomics.com), composed of Markus Brunnermeier, Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane...