Publications

We study the joint determination of fund managers’ contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions, investors make managers’ fees...

We model banks’ liquidity holding decision as a simultaneous game on an interbank borrowing network. We show that at the Nash equilibrium, the...

Risk and return go hand in hand as companion variables central to the teaching and practice of economics and finance. Standard theory and common sense...

The Global Crisis has intensified debates over the merits of financial innovation and the optimal size of the financial sector. This column presents a...

Review of Financial Studies, 27 (6). pp. 1797-1829. 

The Journal of Finance, 69 (3). pp. 1099-1127. 

We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...

The efficient market theory has failed to explain the market behavior and asset pricing of recent years. A new model that incorporates the principal...

We investigate how business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds’ proxy voting using a comprehensive dataset spanning 2003 to 2011. In...

Review of Financial Studies, 27 (3). pp. 663-713. 

We develop a dynamic model of liquidity provision, in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. We compute the equilibrium in...

Review of Financial Studies, 26 (12). pp. 3104-3141. 

Big investors currently pursue two very different strategies when appointing external managers. Their traditional approach is to hire fund managers...

Journal of Financial Economics, 109 (2). pp. 566-582. 

Review of Financial Studies, 26 (8). pp. 1891-1912.

Review of Financial Studies, 26 (8). pp. 1914-1961.