Publications of Mike Burkart

The canonical view of bankruptcy law is that it solves a market failure by imposing a collective choice process that supplants the market. We propose...

We study how firms choose to allocate control over strategic corporate decisions between shareholders and management in a historical setting where...

We study the structure of public firm buyouts in a model that features both the Berle-Means problem (lack of incentives) and the Grossman-Hart problem...

In a canonical takeover model we let informed large shareholders choose between making a bid and initiating a sale to another acquirer. Such takeover...

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 12 (1), 78–130

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 10(1), 44–81

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 5 (2), 239–270.

We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...

The Review of Economic Studies, 82 (3), 922–962.

Review of Finance, 19 (4), 1383–1414.

We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...

In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of...

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to...